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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS∗

A. Issues
This memorandum performs a comparative analysis of United States (“US”) law,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) rules and precedent, and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) rules and precedent relating to the
prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense.1

In particular, this

memorandum addresses (1) whether the prosecution must specifically identify the exculpatory
nature of material being disclosed and (2) the time at which such disclosure must be made.2
The following analysis will aid in clarifying the obligations of the Prosecutor under Rule
68 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”).

∗

SCSL ISSUE 7: “Is the Prosecutor required to bring to the attention of the Defense the “exculpatory” nature of
material being disclosed or is he simply required to disclose material without pointing out that it is exculpatory?
When should disclosure be made? Is it immediately [when] the material comes to the knowledge of the
Prosecutor?”
1

Initially, the author of this memorandum set out to do a comparative analysis of several English-speaking
jurisdictions. Although a majority, if not all, of such jurisdictions recognize a prosecutorial duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense, most of them have not addressed the specific issue relating to the identification
of material as exculpatory. Upon discovery that the US Supreme Court has not decided the issue, that there is a split
among US federal courts, and that the ICTY and ICTR have marginally dealt with the issue, the focus shifted
exclusively to those three jurisdictions. Therefore, this work is limited to an analysis of US law and a combination
of ICTY and ICTR law. For more information on the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in other
English-speaking jurisdictions, see Regina v. Stinchcomb, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C. Can. 1991) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebooks at Tab 100]; David Watt, General Principles of Prosecutorial Disclosure, Watt’s Manual
Crim. Evid. § 24.01 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 110]; John Sprack, The Criminal Procedure
and Investigations Act 1996: Part I: The Duty of Disclosure, Crim. L.R. 1997, May, pp. 308-20 (UK) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebooks at Tab 109]; Edwards v. United Kingdom, 15 E.H.R.R. 417 (E.C.H.R. 1993)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 99]; Solvay et Cie SA v. Commission of the European Communities,
(1995) E.C.R.II-1775 (European Union C.F.I. (1st Chamber)) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 102];
Regina v. TSR, 133 A. Crim. R. 54, Pars. 70-89 (Aus. App. Victoria 2002) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks
at Tab 101].
2

This memorandum deals with the above issues under the law, not according to custom or ethical obligations. The
conclusion reached in this memorandum is strictly based on whether US, ICTY, and ICTR laws require the
prosecution in criminal matters to identify the exculpatory nature of material when disclosing it and whether such
disclosure must occur immediately when the material becomes known to the prosecution. Aside from mentioning
that ethical rules do generally require more of a prosecutor than does the law, no ethical opinions are rendered on the
two issues raised. In the US, federal prosecutors often make personal decisions to specifically identify exculpatory
evidence, but such decisions are made in the name of professionalism, not legal requirements.

1

Rule 68 outlines the duty of the SCSL Prosecutor to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence
which is known to the Prosecutor.3 The obligation generally extends to evidence which is
material to guilt or punishment or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence, and
it is a continuing one. In sum, this memorandum addresses an equivalent duty found within the
US, the ICTY, and the ICTR, focusing on the procedural method and timing of the prosecution’s
disclosure of exculpatory information.
Section II of this memorandum discusses US law governing the prosecution’s duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. Part A of that section covers the general rule, Part
B covers the method of disclosure, and Part C covers the time of disclosure. Section III of this
memorandum collectively discusses ICTY and ICTR rules and precedent governing the
prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. Part A of that section covers
the general rule, Part B covers the method of disclosure, and Part C covers the time of disclosure.
Section IV of this memorandum provides an argument in favor of the rule which should be
applied in the SCSL to each of the two issues presented. Section V briefly summarizes the
material contained in this memorandum.

3

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rule 68, “Disclosure of Exculpatory
Evidence” (2003):
(A) The Prosecutor shall, within 14 days of receipt of the Defence Case Statement, disclose to the defence
the existence of evidence known to the Prosecutor which may be relevant to issues raised in the Defence
Case Statement.
(B) The Prosecutor shall, within 30 days of the initial appearance of the accused, disclose to the defence the
existence of evidence known to the Prosecutor which in any way tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate
the guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. The Prosecutor shall be under
a continuing obligation to disclose any such exculpatory material.

2

B. Summary of Conclusions
The purpose of this memorandum has been to thoroughly examine the existing law and
establish the rule which should be followed by the SCSL. Based on the available US, ICTY, and
ICTR rules and precedent, the following conclusions are propounded:
(1) The SCSL Prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense
under Rule 68 should not include the duty to specifically identify the exculpatory
nature of the material disclosed; and
(2) Disclosure under Rule 68 should occur in the absence of prejudicial delay; in
other words, disclosure should occur in sufficient time for the defense to use the
material effectively at trial.
These conclusions are based on legal rules and precedent, not on preferred lawyering practice or
ethics. Nor are they based on bright-line rules. However, the conclusions are supported by a
majority of the available case law. There is contrary authority on the issues, but it is largely
problematic in its administration and unsupported by substantial case law, and therefore should
not be applied.

3

II.

UNITED STATES LAW4

A. General Rule – Brady v. Maryland and its Progeny5
In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, the US Supreme Court held that suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.6 A due process violation can exist regardless of
whether the suppression was a result of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.7 The
Brady rule has been modified by several courts, but the general duty it establishes is an important
aspect of the defendant’s constitutional due process rights. Brady, the foundation of US law
governing the disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the defense, merits detailed discussion.
In Brady the petitioner and a companion, Boblit, were convicted of first-degree murder in
state court and sentenced to death. Their convictions subsequently were affirmed on appeal.
Their trials were held separately, with petitioner Brady’s taking place first. At his trial Brady
testified that he participated in the crime but that Boblit did the actual killing. He thus admitted
4

It is important to observe that the identification and disclosure of exculpatory evidence is a problematic issue
considering the other laws applicable to disclosure. Like Rule 66 of the SCSL, which requires the prosecution to
provide the defense access to relevant material and witness statements, there are other US laws which govern
potentially exculpatory material. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the prosecution to
disclose relevant evidence to the defense. Furthermore, the Jencks Act requires US prosecutors to disclose evidence
relating to government witnesses. The time limit of such disclosures varies from those required by Brady and SCSL
Rule 68. The result in the US is that most of the exculpatory evidence is provided to the defense as Rule 16 or
Jencks material, and little Brady material remains to be disclosed. If evidence is obviously exculpatory, it will be
disclosed preliminarily under Rule 16, as such material is usually involved in the decision to prosecute. If evidence
could potentially be exculpatory, it is nearly impossible for the prosecution to identify it as such, as it likely does not
have the necessary information to develop an argument for the defense. Thus, a pure Brady problem often never
arises unless certain material is withheld from the defense.
5

For a general overview of US law concerning the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense, see Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Constitutional Duty of Federal Prosecutor to Disclose Brady Evidence
Favorable to Accused, 158 A.L.R. Fed. 401 (1999) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 108]; 21A Am.
Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 979, 1253, 1269-74 (2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 103]; 63C Am.
Jur. 2d Prosecuting Attorney § 24 (2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 104].

6

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 14]. See also
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 27] (general summary
of law).
7

Id.

4

his guilt of first-degree murder but asked that the jury convict him “without capital punishment.”
During the pre-trial stages Brady’s counsel requested from the prosecution Boblit’s extrajudicial
statements. The government showed several such statements to the defense but withheld one in
which Boblit admitted the actual homicide. The defense did not become aware of the suppressed
statements until after Brady had already been tried, convicted, and sentenced, and his conviction
had been affirmed.
Brady petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief, moving for a new trial based on
the discovery of the suppressed evidence. The trial court dismissed the petition. The appeals
court held that the suppression denied Brady due process of law, remanding the case for a retrial
on the question of punishment but not guilt.

The US Supreme Court, with two Justices

dissenting, agreed with the appeals court and held that suppression of the confession was a
violation of due process. In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas stated:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution. The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society
for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states
the proposition candidly for the federal domain: “The United States wins its
point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” A prosecution that
withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would
tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily
on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice, even though, as in
the present case, his action is not “the result of guile,” to use the words of the
Court of Appeals.8

8

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 14] (referring to Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 22]; citing Brady v. State, 174 A.2d
167, 169 (Md. App. 1961) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 15]).

5

In the US federal system the prosecutor’s interest in a criminal proceeding is not to win
the case but to ensure that justice is done.9 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US
Constitution provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.10 A denial of due process has been described as the failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.11 Thus, the constitutional duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence in criminal proceedings is based on the need to establish the truth
in criminal proceedings, to make certain that justice is served, and to ensure that the defendant’s
trial is a fair one.12

9

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 27] (citing Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 13]). See also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 14].

10

U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Fifth Amendment: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

11

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 16] (citing
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 79]
(Due process requires that criminal prosecutions “comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness,” or that
“defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236 (1941) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 20].
12

See generally Brady, 373 U.S. 83 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 14]; Strickler, 527 U.S. 263
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 27]; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebooks at Tab 28]; Berger, 295 U.S. 78 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 13];
Mooney, 294 U.S. 103 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 22]; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 24] (reaffirming Mooney v. Holohan).

6

The purpose of the Brady requirement is to “ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not
occur, ‘not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is
uncovered.’”13 As stated in Bagley,
The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is not to
displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered,
but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.14 Thus, the prosecutor
is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel,15 but only to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant
of a fair trial:
“For unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was
no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and
absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor’s
constitutional duty to disclose . . . But to reiterate a critical point, the
prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure
unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”16
The Supreme Court clearly intended to make the suppression or withholding of material,
exculpatory evidence from the defense a constitutional violation. Thus the prosecution certainly
must provide access to or make available such material to the defense. However, whether due
13

United States v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141, 148-49 (5th Cir. 1996) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 31]
(citing United States v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 612, 619 (5th Cir. 1989) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab
54] (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab
32])).
14

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.6 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 32]. Original footnote 6 reads: “By
requiring the prosecutor to assist the defense in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited departure from a
pure adversary model. The Court has recognized, however, that the prosecutor’s role transcends that of an adversary:
he ‘is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’” Berger, 295 U.S. at 88
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 13]; see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebooks at Tab 14]. (Original citations modified.)
15

Id. at 675 n.7. Original footnote 7 reads: See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at
Tab 28]; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 23]. See also
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, n.8 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 16]. “An interpretation of Brady
to create a broad, constitutionally required right of discovery ‘would entirely alter the character and balance of our
present systems of criminal justice.’” Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117, 87 S. Ct. 793 (dissenting opinion).
“Furthermore, a rule that the prosecutor commits error by any failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused,
no matter how insignificant, would impose an impossible burden on the prosecutor and would undermine the interest
in the finality of judgments.” (Original citations modified.)
16

Id. at 675-76 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 28]).
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process disclosure or access necessarily includes the duty to identify the exculpatory nature of
material being disclosed is debatable. This debate will be revisited in Part B below.
The prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence outlined in Brady exists even in
the absence of a specific request by the defense for such material.17 The duty to disclose
exculpatory information is an ongoing one, as the government has a continuous obligation to
provide material, exculpatory evidence whenever it discovers such evidence in its possession,
even after the trial has been completed.18 A defendant’s constitutional rights are violated, and a
legitimate Brady claim exists, where favorable evidence material to the defense is suppressed or
withheld.19
Evidence is material for Brady purposes if a reasonable probability exists that had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.20
The question is whether, in the absence of the undisclosed evidence, the defendant received a fair
trial, i.e., a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.21 Courts have held that Brady
applies to both exculpatory and impeachment evidence22 but not to inadmissible evidence,23

17

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 28]; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433
(1995) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 19].

18

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 32].

19

Brady, 373 U.S. 83 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 14]. See also Moore, 408 U.S. 786
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 23]; United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1995)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 69].
20

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 32].

21

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 19]; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 [Reproduced
in accompanying notebooks at Tab 32].

22

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 32]; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150 (1972) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 17].
23

United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir. 1991) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 70];
United States v. Kennedy, 890 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1989) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 55]
(citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 89-90 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 14]; United States v. Oxman, 740
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inculpatory evidence,24 neutral evidence,25 or cumulative evidence.26 The suppressed evidence is
to be considered collectively with all of the other evidence available, and where prosecutorial
suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial, a reasonable probability of a
different result is accordingly shown.27
In determining that suppressed evidence should be considered collectively with all other
evidence rather than item by item, the Supreme Court in Kyles v. Whitley pointed out that the
Constitution is not violated every time the prosecution fails or chooses not to disclose evidence
that may be favorable to the defense.28 To determine whether a constitutional violation has
occurred, the reviewing court must make a specific factual inquiry, post-judgment, to ascertain
whether the proceedings would have been different had the suppressed information been
available along with all of the other evidence.29 The Court further held that the Constitution does
not require the prosecution to employ an “open file” policy, as it need not disclose every scintilla
of potentially relevant information in its possession.30 Finally, the Kyles Court noted that the

F.2d 1298, 1311 (3d Cir. 1984) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 67]; United States v. Ranney, 719
F.2d 1183, 1190 (1st Cir. 1983) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 74]).
24

United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1368 (8th Cir. 1996) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab
49].

25

United States v. Flores-Mireles, 112 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1997) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at
Tab 47]. (Prosecution has no duty to disclose evidence which is neutral, speculative or inculpatory, or which is
available to the defense from other sources, or which is not in the prosecution’s control or possession.)

26

Kyles, 514 U.S. 419 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 19]; McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554
(11th Cir. 1996) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 21]; Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir.
1996) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 25]; Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebooks at Tab 49].

27

Id. at 434.

28

Id. at 436-37.

29

See generally Id.

30

Id. at 437.
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Bagley and Brady rules require less of the prosecution than the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, which require disclosure of any evidence tending to exculpate or
mitigate.31
B. Method of Disclosure
The Supreme Court has never established the procedure for the disclosures required by
Brady.32 As a result, there is conflicting authority in the US as to whether the government must
specifically identify Brady material when disclosing it.33

Some courts have held that the

government cannot meet its Brady obligations simply by providing the defense with the relevant
material.

Rather, the government must specifically identify information which it knows

constitutes Brady material.34 To the contrary, other courts have held that there is no authority for
the proposition that the government must specify Brady material within a larger mass of
disclosed information.35 Underlying this theory is the reasoning that the government is not

31

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-37 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 19] (citing ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993) (“A prosecutor should not
intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all
evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which
would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused”); ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) (1984)
(“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall … make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense…”). See also ABA
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) (2003) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall…make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigates the offense…”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 106]. See also supra note 2.

32

United States v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441, 1443 (D. Colo. 1997) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at
Tab 61].

33

United States v. Polishan, 2001 WL 848583, p. 13 (M.D. Pa. 2001) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at
Tab 71].

34

See United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14, 29-30 (D. D.C. 1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at
Tab 53]; McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 61]; Polishan, 2001 WL
848583 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 71].

35

See United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1997) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab
63]; United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 687-88 (D. N.J. 1991) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks
at Tab 46]; United States v. Bloom, 78 F.R.D. 591, 617 (E.D. Pa. 1977) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at
Tab 39]; Polishan, 2001 WL 848583 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 71]; United States v.
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obliged under Brady to provide information which the defense already has or which it can obtain
with reasonable diligence,36 and the identification of Brady material is information which the
defense can obtain through reasonable diligence.37 A discussion of the conflicting US court
decisions follows.
1. The Hsia/McVeigh Line of Cases – Identification of Exculpatory Material Required
The US cases which require the government to specifically identify Brady material are
based on broad interpretations of Brady obligations.38 Such decisions lack detailed reasoning
and do not cite any case law supporting the identification requirements being imposed. The
courts base their judgments on due process principles of fairness and justice,39 but their decisions
go against contrary case law rejecting the identification requirement.40 Two cases which have
required specific identification of Brady material by the prosecution, Hsia and McVeigh, are
described below.
Anzeulotto, 1996 WL 31233, p. 5 (E.D. N.Y. 1996) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 30]; United
States v. Davis, 673 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ill. 1987) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 44].
36

United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1980) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 42]
(citing United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks
at Tab 43]; United States v. Prior, 546 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1977) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at
Tab 73]; Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. at 98 (Fortas, J., concurring) (nondisclosure of information that is merely
repetitious, cumulative, or embellishing of facts otherwise known to defense should not result in conviction reversal)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 18]). Accord United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir.

1991) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 82]; United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir.
1989) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 62]; Williams v. United States, 503 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1974)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 84]; Wallace v. Hocker, 441 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1971) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebooks at Tab 83]; United States v. Brawer, 367 F.Supp. 156 (S.D. N.Y. 1973) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebooks at Tab 41]; Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 63];
Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 46]; Anzeulotto, 1996 WL 31233
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 30]; Polishan, 2001 WL 848583 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebooks at Tab 71].
37

See cases cited supra note 35.

38

See Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 53]; McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 61].

39

See Id.

40

See cases cited supra note 35.
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a. The McVeigh Case41
The McVeigh case was a complicated one in which the defendant was charged with
offenses relating to the bombing of a federal office building. McVeigh filed a pre-trial motion to
compel discovery. The court began its opinion by discussing the original discovery plan outlined
for the case. At an earlier discovery conference, the prosecution said that it intended to follow an
“open file” discovery policy and that it would not identify Brady material when disclosing
information.42 The ruling judge disapproved of that approach, stating, “I don’t consider that the
government has met . . . its obligations under those authorities with respect to due process by
simply saying, ‘This is open discovery; go fish and find what you want, and if there’s anything
there that’s exculpatory, you’re welcome to it.’”43
The McVeigh court approved its previous discovery order, in which it found, among other
things, that open file discovery was insufficient and the government must specifically identify
Brady material.44 The potential problem with open file discovery in a complex case is that the
prosecution can overwhelm the defense with disclosed material and, whether purposefully or not,
conceal the importance of a particular exculpatory document in the mass of files. The McVeigh
court attempted to avoid such concealment by requiring the prosecution to specifically identify
Brady material when disclosing it.
The court then discussed the disclosure required by Brady and the materiality standard
outlined in Kyles. It also noted that “[t]here is no established procedure for the due process

41

McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 61].

42

Id.

43

Id. (citing McVeigh Transcript of Hearing, pps. 44-45 (Dec. 13, 1995).

44

Id.
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disclosures required by Brady.”45 However, the remainder of the opinion failed to discuss the
identification requirement that was previously ordered and affirmed. Presumably the court’s
reasoning on this issue is based solely on its interpretation of due process with no reliance on
precedent which deals with the specific issue of identification. The court focused on making
criminal proceedings as fair as possible, and in its view fairness is best served by requiring the
prosecution to identify Brady material to the defense. However, the court’s means of achieving
its goal are questionable and go against several US cases which have held that the prosecution
need not identify exculpatory material.46 That said, the McVeigh case is not alone, as Hsia is
another in which a court enforced the specific identification requirement on the prosecution.
b. The Hsia Case47
In Hsia the defendant was charged with conspiracy and causing false statements to be
made to the Federal Election Commission in connection with an illegal campaign contributions
scheme. Hsia filed various pre-trial motions to dismiss the charges, in part claiming that the
government failed to meet its Brady obligations. Initially the prosecution made available to the
defense “open file” discovery. The government provided Hsia and her counsel with access to
over 600,000 documents which were in the government’s possession. The defense complained
that it was impossible for it to examine all the documents and identify potentially exculpatory
material and requested that the prosecution identify such material within the documents.
The court began by outlining some “general warnings” or “basic propositions of Brady
jurisprudence.”48

It noted that the government has a duty to disclose any evidence in its

45

McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. at 1449 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 61].

46

See cases cited supra note 35.

47

Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 53].

48

Id. at 29-30.
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possession that is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.49 It recognized
that favorable evidence includes exculpatory or impeachment evidence50 and that the
government must disclose Brady evidence in adequate time for the defense to “use the favorable
material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case.”51
The Hsia court then stated summarily that “open-file discovery does not relieve the
government of its Brady obligations.”52 In making this particular statement, the court cited no
supporting case law.53 It continued by stating that the government cannot satisfy its obligations
by providing the defendant “with access to 600,000 documents and then claiming that she should
have been able to find the exculpatory information in the haystack.”54 It also noted that courts in
its jurisdiction disfavor “narrow readings” of the government’s Brady obligations: “it simply is
insufficient for the government to offer ‘niggling excuses’ for its failure to provide potentially
exculpatory evidence to the defendant, and it does so at its peril.”55 In the words of the court,

49

Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 53] (citing Brady, 373 U.S. 83
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 14]).

50

Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 32]).

51

Id. (citing United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks
at Tab 72]).
52

Id.

53

Id. It seems a curious occurrence that the Hsia court supports the majority of its other “general warnings” or
“basic propositions” with precedent. As a result of its failure to do so with regard to its imposition of the
identification requirement, the source of the court’s statement is unclear and left to speculation. The court later cites
McVeigh for a separate proposition but does not mention it as authority for the identification requirement. The only
apparent justifications mentioned are to promote fairness and justice and to broadly interpret the government’s
Brady obligations. Courts often rely on principles of fairness and balance in meeting out justice, but Hsia and
McVeigh are in the minority in holding that such principles require the specific identification of Brady materials.
54

Id.

55

Id. (citing United States v. Paxson, 861 F.2d 730, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks
at Tab 68]).
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“To the extent that the government knows of any documents or statements that constitute Brady
material, it must identify that material to Ms. Hsia.”56
The court then noted that the prosecution need not “deliver [its] entire file to defense
counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive
the defendant of a fair trial.”57 Furthermore, it is the prosecution’s duty in the first place to
determine whether information in its possession is Brady material.58 The role of the court,
according to Hsia, was not to “referee . . . disagreements about materiality and supervise the
exchange of information,” and it accepted the government’s concession that it would
immediately disclose Brady material which it had in its possession.59
Finally, the court warned the prosecution that it had an “affirmative duty to resolve
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,” and that “if the sword of Damocles is hanging over
the head of one of the two parties, it is hanging over the head of the [government].”60 The Hsia
court concluded by stating that “the prosecutor’s role transcends that of an adversary: he [or she]
‘is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose
interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.’”61 In sum, the court “generally warned,” in the interest of justice, that the government
should identify material it “knows” constitutes Brady material when disclosing information to

56

Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 53].

57

Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 32]).

58

Id.

59

Id. (citing McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. at 1451 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 61]).

60

Id. (citing United States v. Blackley, 986 F. Supp. 600, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 38]).

61

Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.6 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 32] (quoting Berger, 295
U.S. at 88 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 13])).
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the defense. The court’s ruling, however, is inherently fraught with numerous problems and is
contrary to the holdings of many other courts.62
Save for its statements regarding the promotion of fairness and justice, the Hsia court
made no link between the due process “disclosure” required by Brady and the “specific
identification” Hsia required. As many courts have found that “disclosure” means mere “access”
or “availability,” the court’s “specific identification” requirement might be viewed as more than
a “limited departure” from the adversary system.63 Furthermore, many courts have found that
the prosecution’s failure to identify exculpatory material, viewed in retrospect, was not a due
process violation, as the defendant had access to the information and could identify it as
exculpatory through due diligence.64
Several questions remain unanswered by the court:
(1) What if the prosecution did not comply? If the prosecution “knew” of
exculpatory information and disclosed it without specific identification, would a
reviewing court say that is enough to establish a due process violation, even
where the defense could have identified the exculpatory material through due
diligence? Would relief be granted to the defendant, or punishment imposed on
the prosecution, or both?
(2) What standard is to be applied to the prosecution’s knowledge?
prosecution supposed to know the defense strategy?

Is the

(3) Why does the court find, as a preliminary matter, that due process requires the
prosecution to identify Brady material, when a court reviewing the prosecution’s
failure to do so would probably not find that a due process violation occurred, as
the defense had access to the information and could identify it as exculpatory
through due diligence? In other words, if the defendant’s right to a fair trial is
usually not violated by the prosecution’s failure to identify exculpatory material,
why does fairness require such identification as a preliminary matter?

62

Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 53].

63

See supra note 14.

64

See cases cited supra note 35.
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(4) If due process only requires “disclosure” or “access,” which is meant to
remedy “suppression” or “withholding,” why is this court requiring “specific
identification”?
(5) Could the prosecution fulfill the identification requirement by determining that
a large portion of its material is potentially exculpatory and simply identify that
large portion as “Brady material” when disclosing it, essentially placing the
defense in the same position it was in without the identification?
(6) What is more important to the criminal justice system– that the prosecution be
“fair” and identify Brady material, or that the court encourage a “limited
departure” from the adversary system and require the defense to develop its own
case?
(7) If the court is not to act as a “referee” and “supervise the exchange of
information,” how can it enforce the identification requirement?
It is not surprising that the two cases which require prosecutorial identification of
exculpatory material are decisions on pre-trial motions, as opposed to most of the contrary cases,
which are decisions on appeal. It is much easier for a court to initially require identification out
of fairness than to grapple with the materiality and diligence standards to enforce such a
requirement after the trial has been completed. However justifiable the Hsia court’s desires are,
there is very little case law to support its requirement and a significant amount which rejects it.65
As noted throughout this memorandum, one thing is clear – the specific identification of Brady
material has never been required by the US Supreme Court.
2. The Mmahat/Eisenberg Line of Cases – Identification of Exculpatory Material Not
Required
The opposing view is based on the belief that Brady does not require the prosecution “to
conduct a defendant’s investigation or to assist in the presentation of the defense’s case.”66 In
other words, to establish a valid Brady violation in many courts, the defense must show that the
65

See cases cited supra note 35.

66

Id.
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suppressed information was not available to it through due diligence.67 The identification of
exculpatory information by the defense within a large mass of disclosed material is considered
information which the defense can obtain through due diligence.68
Again, many courts have held that the purpose of the Brady requirement is to “ensure that
a miscarriage of justice does not occur, ‘not to displace the adversary system as the primary
means by which truth is uncovered.’”69 Courts have accordingly held that the prosecution’s
disclosure of a large mass of information containing unspecified Brady material was not a
violation of due process where the exculpatory material was available to the defense through due
diligence.70 Such a holding, according to courts, fulfills the aims of Brady in ensuring that the
defendant receives a fair trial and has access to exculpatory material in the prosecution’s
possession, but does not significantly interfere with the adversary system which US courts
employ.71
As stated in United States v. Davis,
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require the government
first to peruse through all its evidence with an eye to the defendant’s theory of the
case and then to specify to the defendant the evidence which supports that theory.
Instead, the [F]ifth [A]mendment prohibits “the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 … (1963)
(emphasis added). Stated alternatively, the [F]ifth [A]mendment requires the
government “to disclose to criminal defendants favorable evidence that is material
67

See cases cited supra note 35.

68

Id.

69

Aubin, 87 F.3d 141 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 31] (citing Johnson, 872 F.2d 612
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 54]; Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 [Reproduced in accompanying
notebooks at Tab 32]).

70

See cases cited supra note 35.

71

See Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 46] (citing United States v.
Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 1988) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 50] (quoting United
States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis added) [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at
Tab 57])); Anzeulotto, 1996 WL 31233 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 30]; Polishan, 2001 WL
848583 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 71].
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either to guilt or to punishment.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S 479, 480 . . .
(1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This disclosure requirement is
satisfied once the government makes the relevant evidence available to the
defendant. See Nassar v. Sissel, 792 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1986) . . . .72
The cases which similarly have held that specific identification of Brady material is not required
are largely based on a narrow view of “disclosure” and application of the due diligence standard,
which was first revealed in Giles v. Maryland.73
a. The “Due Diligence” Standard and Justice Fortas’ Concurrence in Giles v. Maryland74
As previously mentioned, numerous cases have held that due process does not require the
government to furnish the defense with information it already has or, with any reasonable
diligence, can obtain itself.75 Courts have further reasoned that the identification of exculpatory
information by the defense within a large mass of material disclosed to it is information which
the defense can obtain through due diligence.76 The origin of this language can be traced to
Justice Fortas’ concurring opinion in Giles v. Maryland.77 There, the defendants were convicted
of rape and appealed, claiming that they were denied due process by the government’s
suppression of favorable evidence. The Supreme Court remanded the case to allow the state
court to determine whether further hearings on the suppressed evidence were necessary.

72

Davis, 673 F. Supp. at 256 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 44]. (Original citations modified.)

73

See cases cited supra note 35.

74

Giles, 386 U.S. at 98 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 18].

75

See cases cited supra note 35.

76

Id.

77

Giles, 386 U.S. at 98 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 18].
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Justice Fortas concurred in the order to remand the case but did so for separate reasons –
he felt the defendants’ due process rights were violated by the suppression. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Fortas stated:
The State’s obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth
emerges. This is also the ultimate statement of its responsibility to provide a fair
trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No respectable
interest of the State is served by its concealment of information which is material,
generously conceived, to the case, including all possible defenses. This is not to
say that convictions ought to be reversed on the ground that information merely
repetitious, cumulative, or embellishing of facts otherwise known to the defense
or presented to the court, or without importance to the defense for purposes of the
preparation of the case or for trial was not disclosed to defense counsel. It is not
to say that the State has an obligation to communicate preliminary, challenged, or
speculative information.78
In response to this statement, courts have held that the identification of Brady material
among documents disclosed by the government is information which the defense could obtain
through due diligence.79 In such circumstances, the facts have been made available to the
defense, which itself is arguably in as good a position as the government to ascertain the
potential exculpatory value of the disclosed information. Forcing the prosecution to identify
such material would impose more than a “limited departure” from the adversary system currently
in place and would require the prosecution to speculate as to the value of certain material where
the defense is able to do so itself. Finally, according to some courts, due process only requires
disclosure, which is akin to access or availability, and not the specific identification of
exculpatory material “with an eye to the defendant’s theory of the case.”80

78

Giles, 386 U.S. at 98 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 18]. (Original footnote omitted.)

79

See cases cited supra note 35.

80

See Davis, 673 F. Supp. at 256 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 44].

20

b. The Mmahat Case81
One case enforcing the due diligence standard is Mmahat, where the defendants were
convicted of various offenses relating to the misapplication of bank funds. The defendants made
several post-trial motions which were denied and subsequently appealed. The Mmahats claimed
that the government violated its Brady obligations by failing to specifically identify allegedly
exculpatory material that was disclosed to the defense within a large mass of information. In
order to show a constitutional Brady violation, the court held that the defense must demonstrate
that the information allegedly withheld was not available to it through due diligence.82
Early on in the proceedings, the government provided the defense with access to some
500,000 documents relating to the case, with the most important portions indexed. After the trial
was over, the defense discovered exculpatory material within the mass of documents for which it
had previously been searching – two board resolutions favorable to the defense. The defense
subsequently claimed that the government should have specifically alerted it to the resolutions in
response to the defense’s Brady request. The prosecution argued that it had fulfilled its Brady
obligations simply by disclosing the documents.
The government acknowledged that it was aware of the two resolutions. The defense did
not dispute the fact that it had personal knowledge of the existence of the resolutions and had
access to them before trial, though it was not aware of this fact at the time. The court held that
because the defense could have located the resolutions using due diligence, there was no Brady
violation.83 It concluded by stating that “there is no authority for the proposition that the
81

Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 63].

82

Id. (citing Aubin, 87 F.3d at 148-49 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 31]; Brown, 628 F.2d at 473
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 42]).
83

Id.
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government’s Brady obligations require it to point the defense to specific documents within the
larger mass of material that it has already turned over.”84
The Fifth Circuit decided the Mulderig case shortly after it decided Mmahat.85 Mulderig
was charged with the same crimes as the Mmahats, namely various offenses relating to the
misapplication of bank funds.

Mulderig argued that the government violated its Brady

obligations by failing to specify the exculpatory nature of the same two resolutions discussed in
Mmahat. The court’s ruling on this issue essentially mirrored its decision in the Mmahat case,
but it also held that “when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of his trial and
his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the court is his lack of
reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim.”86
c. The Eisenberg Case87
Eisenberg is another of the cases which held that the prosecution need not specifically
identify Brady material disclosed to the defense. In Eisenberg the defendants were charged with
racketeering and various counts of conspiracy. They filed numerous pre-trial motions, including
one requesting the identification of Brady material among documents previously produced by the
government. The government responded by arguing that it had no duty under Brady to identify
exculpatory material among documents produced. It claimed that it had the duty only to make
available to the defense Brady material in its possession to which the defense did not have access
or to which it could not obtain access through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
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identification of Brady material, it claimed, was information the defense could ascertain through
the exercise of reasonable diligence.
The court held that Brady is “designed to ‘assure that the defendant will not be denied
access to exculpatory evidence only known to the [g]overnment.’”88 Quoting the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Eisenberg Court further held that “the [g]overnment is not obliged under
Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he already has or, with any reasonable
diligence, he can obtain himself,” and the identification of Brady material is information the
defense can obtain itself through the exercise of due diligence.89 The court concluded that the
government should not have to expend the effort required to determine whether its material
contains exculpatory evidence where the defense can do so itself through reasonable diligence.90
d. The Anzeulotto Case91
The Anzeulotto court also noted that no bright-line rule controls the scope of the
government’s duty to focus the defense’s attention on the exculpatory nature of disclosed
material.92 In Anzeulotto the defendants were convicted of various crimes involving extortion
and moved for a new trial, claiming that the government failed to meet its Brady obligations.
While reiterating that Brady is designed to provide the defense access to exculpatory information
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85 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 50] (quoting LeRoy, 687 F.2d at 619 (emphasis added)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 57])).
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in the prosecution’s possession, the court also held that “[t]he government is not required to draw
inferences from evidence which defense counsel is in an equal position to draw.”93 Furthermore,
it quoted the Gaggi court, which held that “the government need not supply a map” to the
defense.94
According to the Anzeulotto court, the government is not required to turn over
exculpatory material “if the defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting
him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.”95

Where the government has made

information available to the defense, the defense is in as good a position as the government to
ascertain whether it contains Brady material. However, the government is not permitted to
mislead the defense, e.g., by disclosing evidence and indicating that it is of no value and
subsequently claiming its Brady obligations have been met.96
e. The Polishan Case97
Another helpful case which has addressed this issue is United States v. Polishan. There,
the defendant was convicted of 18 counts related to a financial accounting fraud. Polishan
subsequently moved for an acquittal or, alternatively, a new trial, in part claiming that the
Magistrate Judge erred in making certain discovery rulings. The defense had a period of over
two years to review an estimated 650,000 to 1.2 million pages of documents made available by
the prosecution.

Polishan claimed that “access” to these documents was inadequate, and
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requested that a “document repository” be created and that the government specifically identify
“any evidence in [its] hands . . . which is favorable to the defendant and material to [the]
question of his alleged guilt.”98 In a previous ruling on discovery-related issues, a Magistrate
Judge denied the defense’s request to require the prosecution to specifically identify Brady
material, finding that “the Government has complied with its Brady obligations by providing a
complete open file to the Defendant for more than two (2) years.”99 Polishan did not appeal the
discovery rulings.
On appeal of his conviction, Polishan argued that his ability to prepare for trial was
unfairly inhibited by the need to review the massive amount of documents made accessible by
the prosecution. The court found that Polishan waived further judicial consideration of the
discovery issues by not timely requesting review of the Magistrate Judge’s rulings and that, at
any rate, his complaints concerning the government’s compliance with the Brady rule were
unfounded.100 The court discussed conflicting case law addressing this particular issue. It noted
that “there is indeed some authority to support the proposition that an open-file policy does not
relieve the government of the obligation to identify Brady material.”101 However, it also noted
contrary case law, i.e., that “[t]here is no authority for the proposition that the government’s
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Brady obligations require it to point the defense to specific documents within the larger mass of
material that it has already turned over.”102
The court then went on to quote the Eisenberg case, stating that Brady is “designed to
‘assure that the defendant will not be denied access to exculpatory evidence only known to the
[g]overnment.’”103 It also repeated what many courts previously had held and stated, “The
[g]overnment is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he
already has or, with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.”104 The court concluded
that under the circumstances of this case, where the defendant had considerable access to the
information, sufficient time to review it, and the ability to identify Brady material using due
diligence, the government committed no violation by failing to identify the exculpatory nature of
the disclosed material.105
C. Time of Disclosure
As with the procedural methods for disclosing exculpatory evidence, the Supreme Court
has never explicitly determined the time at which disclosure of Brady materials must occur.106 In
general, the government has a continuing duty to disclose Brady material and must do so
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whenever such material comes into its possession.107 Some courts have held that there can be no
Brady violation where there is no suppression and the exculpatory material is made available to
the defendant during trial.108 Other courts have held that where Brady material is made available
at trial in time for it to be effectively used by the defense, a new trial will not be granted simply
because of a delay.109 Pursuant to such decisions, the defendant must show prejudice to obtain
relief.110
Under these decisions the Brady materiality standards found in Bagley and Kyles appear
to apply to delayed disclosures.

The question seemingly remains whether a reasonable

probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence
been disclosed earlier.111 It remains important to determine whether the defendant received a fair
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence, considering the delayed
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disclosure collectively with the other evidence.112 The applicable standard in the context of
timing, however, has been alternatively described by courts.
According to various courts, a Brady violation can occur if the prosecution delays in
disclosing evidence during trial and the defense can show prejudice, e.g., that the information
came so late that it could not be effectively used.113 The standard is whether the delay prevented
the accused from receiving a fair trial, and due process requirements are fulfilled provided that
disclosure occurs before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the
material at trial,114 or provided that the disclosure remains of value to the defendant.115 It has
also been stated that the prosecution’s failure to timely disclose Brady information warrants
reversal only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed earlier, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.116
In sum, US law generally does not require the prosecution to disclose exculpatory
information immediately when it comes to its knowledge. The prosecution is permitted to delay
disclosure, whether purposefully or not, so long as the defense receives the information in
sufficient time for it to effectively make use of the material at trial. Thus, for example, courts
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have found that the defendant’s due process rights are not violated where impeachment evidence
relating to a prosecution witness is disclosed on the day the witness testifies.117 But if the
delayed disclosure undermines confidence in the verdict and a reasonable probability exists that
the result of the trial would have been different absent the delay, then the defendant’s
constitutional rights have been violated.
III.

ICTY AND ICTR RULES AND PRECEDENT118

A. General Rule – Rule 68 and its Interpretation
Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence governs the disclosure of exculpatory
material for both the ICTY and the ICTR.119 Rule 68 is identical in the two tribunals but differs
from the language of SCSL Rule 68.120 Under Rule 68 of the ICTY and ICTR, the prosecution
must, “as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence the existence of material known to the
prosecution which in any way tends to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused
or may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.”121
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Not only must the Prosecutor disclose the existence of exculpatory material known to it,
but it must actually disclose to the defense any such evidence in its control or possession.122
Unlike the law of several US jurisdictions, Rule 68 evidence is not restricted to material which
would be admissible at trial, but encompasses “all information in any form which falls within the
quoted description.”123

The obligation to disclose is an ongoing one that continues after

judgment,124 but relief for a violation of that obligation will not necessarily be granted where it is
shown that the evidence is already accessible to the accused.125
The above rule was at issue in Prosecutor v. Blaskic. There the defendant was convicted
of various war crimes and crimes against humanity. On appeal the defendant sought production
of certain Rule 68 materials in the possession of the prosecution. The Tribunal found that “Rule
68 provides a tool for [the] disclosure of evidence.”126 The rule places the Prosecutor under a
continuing legal obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence, as “[t]he application of Rule 68 is
not confined to the trial process.”127 The Appeals Chamber then stated that “the Prosecution may
still be relieved of the obligation under Rule 68, if the existence of the relevant exculpatory
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evidence is known and the evidence is accessible to the [defendant], as the [defendant] would not
be prejudiced materially by this violation.”128
The prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory information is supported by the principles
underlying an adversarial system of justice and the need for a balanced and fair trial.129 The
ICTY has acknowledged the “considerable strain” which the required searches for exculpatory
information have placed on the resources of the prosecution but maintains that Rule 68 serves an
“important function.”130

Because of the prosecution’s “superior access” to potentially

exculpatory material, it is required to perform these searches.131 Part of the prosecution’s duty is
to serve as “ministers of justice assisting in the administration of justice” and to thereby assist the
accused through the disclosure of exculpatory material.132 Finally, the obligation under Rule 68
is not a secondary one but is as important as the obligation to prosecute.133
The initial decision as to whether material in its custody or control is exculpatory or
potentially exculpatory must be made by the prosecution, which is presumed to have acted in
good faith in exercising its discretion.134 When the existence of such material comes to the
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prosecution’s notice, the Prosecutor is to disclose it as soon as practicable.135 In order for the
Tribunal to intervene, the defense must establish that the prosecution has abused its discretion
and suppressed exculpatory evidence by prima facie establishing the exculpatory nature of the
material requested and that it is in the prosecution’s possession.136 However, the defense’s
request need not be so specific as to precisely identify the documents sought.137
B. Method of Disclosure
The ICTY and ICTR have yet to make any specific rulings outlining the procedural
methods which govern the disclosure of exculpatory material. The ICTY, as mentioned, has held
that relief for a Rule 68 violation will not necessarily be granted where it is shown that the
evidence is already accessible to the accused.138 This finding, announced in Blaskic, is similar to
the US line of cases which have held that due process does not require the government to furnish
the defense with information the defense already has or, with any reasonable diligence, can
obtain itself.139 It would not be a stretch to assume that the ICTY would follow the approach of
these US cases by reasoning that the identification of exculpatory material within information
disclosed to the defense is information which the defense can obtain through the exercise of due
diligence.
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In fact, the ICTY did make this determination in Krajisnik & Plavsic, finding that the
defendant was not harmed by the prosecution’s failure to identify exculpatory material where the
defense had access to the material and could identify its relevance through due diligence.140
However, in the same decision, the ICTY also held that “as a matter of practice and in order to
secure a fair and expeditious trial, the Prosecution should normally indicate which material it is
disclosing under the Rule.”141 The Krajisnik & Plavsic decision, and its inherent confusion, will
be addressed presently.
1. The Krajisnik & Plavsic Case (In Light of the Blaskic Case)
In its pre-trial “Decision on Motion from Momcilo Krajisnik to Compel Disclosure of
Exculpatory Evidence Pursuant to Rule 68,” the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic held
that “the Prosecution is not obliged to indicate whether material previously disclosed falls under
Rule 68 or not, but that it will be required to do so for all material disclosed from the date of this
Decision.”142 The decision is brief and does not cite any precedent. In one respect, it appears to
follow the principles outlined in Blaskic. In another respect, however, it appears to contradict
Blaskic and adopt a contrary view of the law. It might even be described as a combination of
both the Mmahat and Hsia decisions described above, two US decisions which espouse
fundamentally opposite positions.143
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In Krajisnik & Plavsic the defendants were accused of various war crimes and moved to
compel the disclosure of exculpatory evidence pursuant to Rule 68. The prosecution had an
estimated one to three million documents in its possession to evaluate in order to determine
whether they were relevant to the case.144 As the prosecution was evaluating these documents, it
turned over any relevant material to the defense as it was discovered, pursuant to its obligations
under Rules 66 and 68, and did not specify the nature of each document’s relevancy to the case.
In July of 2001 the defense, after stating that it had reviewed the materials disclosed,
requested that the prosecution go back and evaluate the documents, specifically identify any
potentially exculpatory information, and specifically identify such information in all future
disclosures. The defense argued that the word “disclose” includes “an affirmative showing
rather than a delivery of the thousands of pages of paper.”145 It also argued that “as a matter of
principle,” the prosecution has an obligation under Rule 68 to identify exculpatory material
rather than to merely turn over thousands of documents.146
In response, the prosecution argued:
(a) the plain meaning of Rule 68 does not require the Prosecution to characterise
discovered material as inculpatory or exculpatory, it is for the Defence to define
the character of the evidence discovered to it;
(b) the Motion is redundant as the Defence has indicated that it has reviewed the
material already disclosed to it and has therefore been able to identify exculpatory
material for itself; and
(c) the Defence is in the best position to identify what material disclosed to it is
exculpatory, not the Prosecution.147
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In its decision on the motion, the Trial Chamber stated the following:
Considering (a) that while Rule 68 does not specifically require the Prosecution
to identify the relevant material, but merely to disclose it;
(b) nonetheless, as a matter of practice and in order to secure a fair and
expeditious trial, the Prosecution should normally indicate which material it is
disclosing under the Rule and it is no answer to say that the Defence are in a
better position to identify it;
(c) however, in the instant case, the material has been disclosed and the Defence
has had the opportunity of reviewing it and, therefore, no injustice is done to the
Defence; and
(d) therefore, given the resources expended already and the stage of pre-trial
development, it would not be efficient or reasonable to order the Prosecution to
identify material that has already been disclosed in this way.148
The first principle enumerated by the Trial Chamber is quite clear, as Rule 68 obviously
does not per se require the prosecution to identify exculpatory material when disclosing it.149
Likewise, the third principle is logical, as the defense was able to ascertain the relevance of the
material through due diligence and therefore was not harmed by the prosecution’s failure to
specifically identify exculpatory material. Similarly, the fourth principle makes sense, as an
order requiring the prosecution to go back and identify potentially exculpatory material already
disclosed would inhibit the trial from progressing. That leaves the second principle yet to be
discussed, and therein lies the problem with the ruling.
Again, part (b) under the Trial Chamber’s considerations states, “nonetheless, as a matter
of practice and in order to secure a fair and expeditious trial, the Prosecution should normally
indicate which material it is disclosing under the Rule and it is no answer to say that the Defence

148

Krajisnik & Plavsic, 2001 WL 1793903 [Reproduced in accompanying notebooks at Tab 95].

149

See supra note 118.

35

are in a better position to identify it.”150

This statement, read in light of the other three

considerations, creates a conundrum for anyone attempting to apply the law of the case. Within
the same discovery ruling, the Trial Chamber found (1) that the prosecution’s failure to identify
the exculpatory nature of previously disclosed material was not unfair because Rule 68 does not
explicitly require such identification, the defense had the opportunity to review the material and
therefore no injustice was committed, and it would be a waste of resources to force the
prosecution to go back and identify the material; yet (2) that it is unfair for the prosecution not to
indicate the material which it is disclosing under Rule 68.151
In one respect the Trial Chamber seems to be following the Blaskic decision in holding
that relief for a violation of the prosecution’s Rule 68 obligation will not necessarily be granted
where it is shown that the evidence is already accessible to the accused.152 Here, the defense was
provided access to the unidentified exculpatory material and was able to identify it.

The

prosecution’s previous failure to identify the material thus was not unfair. However, the Trial
Chamber also made a conclusive, and seemingly contradictory, determination that principles of
fairness require the prosecution to normally identify exculpatory information.

This

determination is puzzling in light of the Trial Chamber and Blaskic findings that the failure to do
so would not necessarily result in unfairness.
As occurred in light of the Hsia decision, the Krajisnik & Plavsic decision raises several
unanswered questions:
(1) Is a “matter of practice” the same as a legal “obligation” or “duty”?
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(2) If the prosecution “should normally” indicate Rule 68 material, when exactly
is it required or not required to do so?
(3) Must the prosecution identify Rule 68 material only when it “knows” the
material falls under the rule? If so, when is the prosecution deemed to have such
“knowledge”?
(4) What will be the result if the prosecution does not comply with the order to
identify Rule 68 material? Would a reviewing court apply the Blaskic and,
indeed, the Krajisnik & Plavsic standards and find that no material violation of
the defendant’s rights occurred and no relief shall be granted? Would the
prosecution be punished for such failure?
(5) Could the prosecution simply identify a large mass of information as “Rule 68
material” and essentially leave the defense in the same position it would have
been in without such identification?
(6) If the rule merely requires “disclosure,” “access,” or “availability,” why does
the court believe that fairness also requires it to include “specific identification”?
(7) What is more important – that the prosecution be “fair” and identify
exculpatory material, or that the court encourage a “limited departure” from the
adversary system and require the defense to develop its own case?
(8) Would an “open file” policy relieve the prosecution of the identification
requirement? Could the prosecution satisfy the court’s ruling in future cases by
initially providing access to all of the information in its possession? Or, in the
process of developing its case, would the prosecution have to identify exculpatory
material as it came to the prosecution’s knowledge?
The issue has not since been addressed by the Tribunals and it is not clear how they would
respond to the above questions.
2. The Galic Transcript
Also pertinent to the subject is the Galic transcript from a status conference held on
October 18, 2000.153 When asked by ICTY Judge Rodrigues about the disclosure of Rule 68
material, the prosecution stated:
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With regard to Rule 68, at this time we are undertaking searches with that very
specifically in mind. I understand, if my understanding of the Rules is correct,
that our duty is to disclose, not necessarily to sort of put up a flag that it’s Rule 68
that we’re doing, but where this is sufficiently clear, I think it is perhaps
appropriate, to assist my friend, that we would do so, and I think we will do so. In
appropriate cases, we will try and batch this together and let him have it under
that guise. But we are conscious that this is an obligation that runs, and it will
simply, if we come across such evidence, it will be served as it is found.154
An important point to be made is that neither Judge Rodrigues nor the defense objected to
the prosecution’s statements.

In fact, defense counsel later stated “pretty much what [the

Prosecutor] has reported to you just now he and I discussed at that time, so I am appreciative of
the fact that he is making the effort to supply the Defence with the Rule 66 material, as well as
the 68.”155 So, not only does one aspect of the Krajisnik & Plavsic ruling appear to contradict its
own findings and those of Blaskic, but it also contradicts the principles discussed in the Galic
transcript, i.e., that there is no affirmative “duty” to “put up a flag” that it is Rule 68 material
which is being disclosed.156
C. Time of Disclosure
Under Rule 68 of the ICTY and ICTR, the prosecution is required to disclose exculpatory
information to the defense “as soon as practicable.”157 The duty to disclose is of an ongoing
nature and continues after judgment has been entered.158 Rule 68 places the Prosecutor under a
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continuing legal obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence, as “[t]he application of Rule 68 is
not confined to the trial process.”159

When the existence of such material comes to the

prosecution’s notice, the Prosecutor is to disclose it as soon as practicable.160 The question will
be whether any alleged delay materially prejudiced the defendant, and where no such prejudice is
shown, no relief will be granted.161
It should be noted that the “as soon as practicable” language suggests that any
unreasonable delay by the prosecution will constitute a violation of Rule 68. The language of
Rule 68 implies that disclosure should occur as soon as reasonably possible under the
circumstances.162

This is contrary to US and SCSL law, where there is no “as soon as

practicable” requirement. US law requires disclosure in sufficient time for the defendant to
make use of the information effectively at trial.163 This requirement may suggest that, under US
law, prosecution should disclose the information as soon as practicable so as to ensure that the
defendant can make use of the information, but it is not necessarily required as it is in Rule 68 of
the ICTY and ICTR.164
IV.

ARGUMENT
Under US, ICTY, and ICTR law, the prosecution has the duty to disclose exculpatory

evidence in its possession to the defense. This memorandum addresses two issues yet to be
resolved by the above jurisdictions in relation to that duty. The first is whether the prosecution
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must specifically identify the exculpatory nature of material being disclosed to the defense. The
second involves the time at which the disclosure of exculpatory information must occur. Most
problems have arisen with regard to the first issue. The method of disclosure will be addressed
first, and it will be argued that the prosecution’s duty to disclose does not include the duty to
identify the exculpatory nature of material being disclosed.
A. Method of Disclosure – Identification of Exculpatory Material Should Not Be Required
As for the method of disclosure of exculpatory evidence, there are two basic ways in
which the court will face the identification issue – pre-judgment or post-judgment. First, the
court, as a preliminary discovery matter, could determine whether principles of fairness and
justice require the prosecution to identify the exculpatory nature of material being disclosed to
the defense.165

Second, the court could review the prosecution’s failure to identify the

exculpatory nature of material already disclosed and determine whether the defendant’s due
process rights have been violated and, if so, whether the defendant is entitled to any relief as a
result of said failure.166
Most courts hearing the issue in the second situation have held that the defendant’s rights
were not violated by the prosecution’s failure to identify the exculpatory nature of material
already disclosed where the defense had access to the material and could identify it as
exculpatory through due diligence.167 Thus, it is unlikely that any court within the US, ICTY, or
ICTR would enforce the identification requirement in the second scenario, i.e., after disclosure of
the material has already occurred and the material has become available to the defense, as long
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as the defense has had adequate time to perform its own investigation.168 As far as the author has
been able to ascertain, no courts have retrospectively found that the failure to identify
exculpatory material violated the defendant’s rights. To the contrary, a large number of courts
have found that such a failure does not constitute a violation.169 According to these courts, the
government is not required to disclose information which is available to the defendant through
due diligence, and the identification of exculpatory material is information which the defendant
could ascertain through exercise of such diligence.170
As a result, the real problem arises in the first scenario, where the court is deciding, as a
preliminary discovery matter, whether fairness and justice require the identification of
exculpatory material. Some courts have found that the prosecution is required to identify the
exculpatory nature of disclosed material in the interests of fairness and justice, while some courts
have rejected such requirement.171 There are several fundamental characteristics found in the
US, ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL legal systems related to fairness and justice.172 First, the defendant
has the right to a fair trial. Second, the prosecutor’s interest in a criminal proceeding is not to
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win the case but to ensure that justice is done.173 Third, the above systems of justice are
designed to establish the truth. Fourth, the above systems are based on the adversary model.174
The disclosure of exculpatory information is required “to ensure that a miscarriage of
justice does not occur” and is based on the requirement that the defendant’s trial be a fair one.175
However, the requirement is not meant to “displace the adversary system as the primary means
by which truth is uncovered.”176

The duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused

“represents a limited departure from a pure adversary model.”177 Finally, creation of a broad
right of discovery “would entirely alter the character and balance of our present systems of
criminal justice."178 These fundamental principles have to be balanced and considered along
with available case law in determining whether the identification requirement should be
imposed.
Looking at all of the available authority on the subject, it appears that the cases which
have rejected the identification requirement were correct in doing so. The prosecution’s duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence was clearly enforced to make available to the defendant, or
provide the defendant access to, evidence in the prosecution’s possession.179 In post-judgment
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determinations, relief has only been granted where material, exculpatory evidence was
suppressed or withheld, in other words, where the defendant was prejudiced by the prosecution’s
failure to provide access to the evidence.180
That is the “limited departure” from the adversary system which has been required.
Further requiring the prosecution to sort through the material and alert the defense to its
exculpatory nature would make that narrow, limited departure a broad, significant one. The
prosecution is required to aid the defense in providing it equal access to material, exculpatory
evidence; it is not required to help the defense in preparing and presenting its case.181 It is true
that the prosecution’s interest in a criminal proceeding is to establish the truth and serve justice,
but that is not meant to require the prosecution “to peruse through all its evidence with an eye to
the defendant’s theory of the case and then to specify to the defendant the evidence which
supports that theory” or to require the prosecution to provide the defense a “map” to guide it
through the proceeding.182 Indeed, to impose such a requirement would force the prosecution to
identify each and every possible defense theory.
The argument that the prosecution has more resources available to it does not support the
finding that it should aid the defense by identifying exculpatory material. The prosecution’s
resources are available to develop its own case and to pursue truth and justice, not to take time
out of its investigation to focus the defense’s attention on the exculpatory nature of particular
evidence.183 Court-appointed counsel is available to the defendant as a guaranteed right, and
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such counsel is presumed competent to identify the exculpatory nature of information disclosed
to it.184 There are other existing remedies offered to the defense to provide it more resources,
such as extensions of time, increased funding, or additional counsel, which might be preferred
over requiring the prosecution to develop the defense’s case. Also, there is nothing preventing
the prosecution from identifying exculpatory material, but requiring it to do so would be
extremely problematic.
The argument that the prosecution is better able to identify exculpatory material because
only it knows the charges against the defendant, or that the defendant is better able to identify
such material as only it knows the nature of its defense, is very circular. It should be sufficient
that each side has the relevant material available to it. It is not that either side is better-able to
make such identification but that the defense simply is capable of doing so.

Where the

exculpatory material is accessible to the defense and it can identify the nature of said material
through due diligence, there is simply no justification for requiring the prosecution to do so
instead.185
B. Time of Disclosure – Exculpatory Material Should Be Disclosed in Sufficient Time for
Defense to Effectively Use it at Trial
As for the time at which the disclosure of exculpatory information must occur, the
question is generally whether the defendant will be prejudiced by delayed disclosure. So long as
the defendant has sufficient time to make effective use of the material, then delay does not cause
prejudice. However, the problem which arises under ICTY and ICTR law is the requirement that
the prosecution disclose the exculpatory evidence “as soon as practicable.” To the author’s
184
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knowledge, there is no case law which has dealt with this issue. It might be suggested that the
language would condone only a reasonable delay, as opposed to any non-prejudicial delay.186
The language of SCSL Rule 68 specifies that the prosecution must disclose, within 14
days of receipt of the Defence Case Statement, evidence known to it and which is relevant to
issues raised in the statement.187 Also, the prosecution must disclose, within 30 days of the
defendant’s initial appearance, any material known to it which tends to be exculpatory.188 That
duty is a continuing one.189 There is no “as soon as practicable” language in SCSL Rule 68,
which implies that a delay can be more than just reasonable. Rather, omission of the “as soon as
practicable” language suggests that any non-prejudicial delay, whether purposeful or not, would
be permitted under SCSL law.190
V.

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this memorandum has been to thoroughly examine the existing law and

establish the rule which should be followed by the SCSL. Based on the available US, ICTY, and
ICTR rules and precedent, the following conclusions are propounded:
(1) The SCSL Prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense
under Rule 68 should not include the duty to specifically identify the exculpatory
nature of the material disclosed; and
(2) Disclosure under Rule 68 should occur in the absence of material delay; in
other words, disclosure should occur in sufficient time for the defense to use the
material effectively at trial.
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These conclusions are based on legal rules and precedent, not on preferred lawyering practice or
ethics. Nor are they based on bright-line rules. However, the conclusions are supported by a
majority of the case law which is available. There is contrary authority on the issues, but it is
largely problematic in its administration and unsupported by substantial case law, and therefore
should not be applied.
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